Some microbes have a fascinating ability to degrade compounds that are toxic for humans in a process called bioremediation. Although these traits help microbes survive the toxins, carrying them can be costly if the benefit of detoxification is shared by all surrounding microbes, whether they detoxify or not. Detoxification can thereby be seen as a public goods game, where non-degrading mutants can sweep through the population and collapse bioremediation. Here, we constructed an evolutionary game theoretical model to optimize bioremediation in a chemostat initially containing "cooperating" (detoxifying) microbes. We consider two types of mutants: "cheaters" that do not detoxify, and mutants that become resistant to the toxin through private mechanisms that do not benefit others.
of strategies (i.e., frequencies sum to one), for example in the replicator dynamics (Cressman and Tao, is the ratio between intrinsic growth and death at a given toxin concentration, whether death is by toxin 83 or by dilution:
At an equilibrium, W i (T ) = 1/ 1 − j x j should be satisfied for any strategy i that exists in the 85 chemostat (x i > 0). In addition, when W i (T ) > W j (T ), strategy i increases faster or decreases slower 86 than strategy j. For simplicity, this basic model assumes that strategies cannot mutate into each other.
87
We extend it to include mutations in Appendix 5.
88
First, the intrinsic growth rates in this model differ depending on the costs each strategy pays.
89
Cooperators pay a cost, c d , for producing degrading enzymes, which are regarded as a public good since 90 they reduce environmental toxicity and the death rate of all cells independently of their strategy. In 91 addition, toxin resistance carries a cost, c r . Such fitness costs, where resistant cells have lower fitness 92 than sensitive ones in the absence of toxins, have been observed in many species (Andersson and Levin, 93 1999; Andersson and Hughes, 2010; San Millan and MacLean, 2017) . In contrast to the production of 94 degrading enzymes, however, where all cells benefit from decreased toxicity, the evolution of resistance 95 can be regarded as an investment into a private good, where only the resistant cells themselves benefit.
96
Assuming that the costs are additive, the intrinsic growth rate r i of each strategy is defined as follows:
r sCh = r (3b)
where r is the maximum intrinsic growth rate.
98
Cellular death rate δ i (T ) increases with toxin concentration T , and is represented by a Hill equation 99 as is common in models of death by drugs (Chou, 2006) :
where d max is the maximum death rate, K i is the half maximal toxin concentration of strategy i, and n
To describe the population dynamics of each strategy, however, it is necessary to also formulate the dynamics of the toxin concentration because it affects the microbes' death rate, and because the toxin 109 concentration changes over time as cooperators detoxify it. The dynamics of the toxin concentration T in 110 the chemostat are defined by the concentration flowing into and out of the chemostat, and detoxification 111 by cooperators:
where T in is the toxin concentration flowing into the chemostat, and f x Co is the degradation rate 113 which is assumed to follow a Michaelis-Menten function: As the goal of this study is to maximize the efficiency of detoxification, we define detoxification 118 efficiency φ as the difference between the toxin concentration flowing into and out of the chemostat 119 multiplied by the dilution rate:
With this definition, φ is proportional to the amount of detoxified liquid and is composed of the degree 
where i is the focal strategy (see Appendix 1 for derivation). By solving dT /dt = 0 and dx i /dt = 0, one 131 can find a trivial equilibrium (x i = 0) and one or more non-trivial equilibria (T * , x * i > 0) that should satisfy:
which we can calculate numerically using Newton's method.
134
In the absence of cooperators, we assume that the toxin concentration is equal to the incoming toxin µ 1 (1 − µ 2 ) and exclude it. Then, rCh can appear in the population of sCh with probability (1 − µ 1 ) µ 2 , 192 but may invade or not, depending on the toxin concentration ( Fig. 3) . To maximize the objective function in Eq (7), we consider three stable equilibrium states with different can calculate the equilibria (analytically or numerically) and their corresponding detoxification efficiency 214 φ for each culture condition (values of α and T in ). We can then find the optimal culture conditions 215 that maximize this efficiency (Fig. 4) , although the equilibrium can be ecologically unstable for some 216 parameter values.
217
Intuitively, the maximum efficiency is larger in a mono-culture of cooperators than in a co-culture of 218 cooperators and cheaters of different levels of resistance (see Appendix 6). If cheaters can be excluded 219 from the population by changing α and T in , the optimal strategy for cultivation is (i) to exclude the cheaters by adjusting the culture conditions, and then (ii) to change the culture conditions to maximize the productivity of a mono-culture of cooperators.
Inoculating cooperators to optimize detoxification efficiency 223
Above, we showed that even though they are unlikely to appear by double mutation, cooperators can 224 invade a population of cheaters if their level of resistance is different (Fig. 3) . Instead of waiting for 225 these mutants to arise naturally, it would be more efficient to manually inoculate cooperators into the 226 population, and to change α and T in to allow them to invade successfully and to exclude the cheaters.
227
Assuming that we cannot observe the prevalence of each strategy at will, the problem is how often to 228 inoculate sensitive or resistant cooperators to maximize detoxification efficiency over time. If cooperator 229 inoculation probabilities are too small, cheaters will dominate the population, leading to a detoxification 230 efficiency of zero. If they are too large, we may inoculate cooperators unnecessarily (e.g., sCo into a mono-231 culture of sCo) or when they cannot invade (e.g., sCo into a mono-culture of sCh). Such unfavorable 232 inoculations can be costly because they can require a higher in-flowing toxin concentration T in , and result 233 in reduced detoxification efficiency for some time.
234
To optimize cooperator inoculation probabilities m 1 and m 2 for the sensitive or resistant cooperators, can exclude cheaters that differ in their resistance level ( Fig. 5A , but see Appendix 7 for a case where 242 cooperators cannot exclude cheaters), the probability distribution of the population states converges to 243 a unique stationary distribution π π π * in the limit of s → ∞, regardless of the initial distribution π π π(0): 244 π * (m m m; µ µ µ) = π * (m m m; µ µ µ) P (m m m; µ µ µ) .
Even though the transitions are probabilistic, we assume that the establishment of strategies following 245 mutation or inoculation (i.e., short-term dynamics) is deterministic. Relaxing this assumption by intro- 
To maximize the expected cumulative detoxification efficiency Φ, therefore, we can calculate m that 253 maximizes Eq (11). In Box 1 we show an example of how to use this approach in practice.
Box 1: An example of optimizing detoxification efficiency
Imagine that we have set up the experimental system described, and would like to compute the optimal inoculation probabilities. We first need to define the Markov chain to make predictions, and second, we need to experimentally measure the parameters of our bacterial strains, in particular their degradation efficiency φ i at each of the different states i of the Markov chain.
To establish the Markov chain, we begin with a few simplifying assumptions: (i) that µ 2 = 0, such that cooperators can only invade a population of cheaters that differ in the level of resistance by inoculation, and (ii) that mutations and the manual inoculation of a cooperator strategy can occur only in a mono-culture (i.e., at most two strategies can exist simultaneously in the population). We further assume that the parameters are in a range where at certain α, T in , (iii) sCo and rCo can mutually exclude each other, and (iv) sCo and rCo can exclude rCh and sCh, respectively. Under these assumptions ( and φ φ φ. At first, the optimal values of m 1 and m 2 are zero, because the state of the population is most likely to be a mono-culture of sCo, in which case inoculating cooperators would be pointless.
However, as time passes, mutations will arise, and the population is likely to transition to a state of sCh mono-culture; then, the optimal values of m 1 and m 2 increase. At about 1,000 time steps, the optimal values of m 1 and m 2 converge to the values which maximize detoxification efficiency at the stationary distributionΦ described by Eq (11). When µ 2 > 0 (relaxing assumption (i)), the number of states increases and the state transition diagram becomes more complex. As long as the Markov chains is ergodic, however, it is possible to find the stationary distribution π * and the optimal values of m 1 and m 2 that maximize Eq (11). We show how to find the optima for non-ergodic Markov chains in Appendix 7. Fig. A.9. (B) The optimal values of m1 and m2 (the blue and pink solid lines, respectively) which maximize the cumulative efficiency defined by Eq (A.67) calculated using Dynamic Programming. The two dashed lines represent the values of m1 and m2 which maximize Eq (11). The initial state of the population is a mono-culture of sCo. Around 1,000 time steps, the optimal values of m1 and m2 for Eq (A.67) converge to the values which maximize Eq (11). In practice, the detoxification efficiency at each of the 14 states of the model as well the mutation probabilities would be experimentally measured and plugged into the model to calculate the values of m1 and m2 that would maximize cumulative efficiency. The plot above was generated using the following fictitious values, as an illustration: µ1 = 0.01, µ2 = 0, φ φ φ = {0.4, 0.2, 0, 0.15, 0.3, 0.15, 0, 0.2, 0.35, 0.35, 0.3, 0, 0.2, 0}. See Appendix 7 for more detail.
Discussion

256
In this study, we have shown how to control the ecological and evolutionary dynamics of a microbial 257 population growing in a chemostat in order to optimize the bioremediation of a toxic liquid. Public 258 goods games where cooperators increase the growth rates of surrounding cells at a cost to themselves 259 have been extensively studied, both empirically and theoretically (Allen et al., 2016; Hauert et al., 2006 Hauert et al., , 260 2008 Griffin et al., 2004; Gokhale and Hauert, 2016; Sanchez and Gore, 2013) . Rather than increasing 261 the growth rate of others, cooperators in our model degrade toxic compounds, which decreases the death 262 rate of surrounding cells (O'Brien et al., 2014) . This scenario enables us to introduce the evolution of 263 resistance to the toxin, e.g. through efflux pumps, as a private good, which we base on studies of drug-264 dose effect and resistance to it (Chou, 2006; Sampah et al., 2011) . Unsurprisingly, cheaters always exclude 265 cooperators with the same private resistance level because detoxification is costly (West et al., 2007b) . 266 We show, however, that because the benefit of private resistance depends on the toxin concentration in 267 the chemostat, cooperators can invade a population of cheaters that differ in their private resistance. The 268 co-occurrence of two strains that differ both in their degradation ability as well as their resistance level is 269 unlikely to suddenly arise by mutation, especially if we assume that mutations are rare. To maintain the 270 degradation of toxins, therefore, it is necessary to periodically inoculate cooperators into the chemostat 271 while changing the dilution rate and in-flowing toxin concentration to guarantee invasion success.
272
Optimal values for these parameters (cooperator inoculation probabilities, dilution rate, and in-flowing 273 toxin concentration) that maximize the detoxification efficiency of the system can be calculated using our 274 model. As input, the model requires experimental measurements of growth and death rates of the chosen 275 microbe and its mutants (i.e., intrinsic growth rate of each strategy r i , maximum death rate d max , Hill 276 coefficient n, median-effect toxin concentrations K s , K r , and degradation efficiencies φ of cooperators).
277
Our model and its results can also apply to problems other than bioremediation that involve survival 278 in toxic environments. In essence, we are studying the evolutionary dynamics of public resistance (which 279 is cooperative) and private resistance (which is not). Consider, analogously, two types of antibiotic resis- interesting aspect is that the benefits of resistance depend on toxin concentration in the chemostat, which 287 is affected by the density of cooperators and the toxin concentration flowing into the chemostat. In other 288 words, the public goods game affects the benefit of the private goods. This is why cooperators can invade 289 a population of cheaters when they differ in their resistance level (Fig. 2F ).
290
Of course, our model relies on a number of assumptions and focuses only on a subset of possible bioremediation systems. First, we only consider extracellular toxin degradation (e.g. by enzyme secretion),
292
while toxins can also be degraded inside cells (O'Brien and Buckling, 2015) . For intra-cellular degrada-293 tion, a different functional form of detoxification f (x Co ) would be necessary, but we expect similar results 294 as long as this function increases monotonically with the density of cooperators. Indeed, the invasion 295 analysis is independent of the form of f (x Co ). Similarly, we assume that toxins kill the microbes and 296 that their degradation does not contribute to growth. In reality, many compounds that are undesirable 297 for humans are instead used as substrates by microbes (Atashgahi et al., 2018) . This latter case is simpler 298 than the one we consider here, since detoxification is no longer cooperative and there is no risk of cheaters 299 arising and collapsing the system. Finally, detoxification may carry a negligible cost, for example if it the 300 toxic compound is neutralized by a change in pH, which occurs naturally due to a microbe's metabolism.
301
Another issue is how to define detoxification efficiency φ. Rather than Eq (7) one could, for example, 302 define φ as the time needed for the toxins to decrease to a negligible concentration. This would change the 303 optimal culture conditions α and T in , but not the procedure to find the optimal introduction probabities 304 of cooperators m m m, which are independent of the formulation of φ. Our model also fixes some parameters, 305 such as the Hill coefficient n, which can evolve in reality (Sampah et al., 2011) . Similarly, the cost 306 of resistance c r can decrease over time due to compensatory evolution (Andersson and Hughes, 2010;
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